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Abstract
We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk averse in-
vestors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk-free
money market account, a stock written on a default-free dividend process, and a de-
faultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endoge-
nous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay
between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties
of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a
jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the dividend
process. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between
investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct
a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and
determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by
different investors.
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1 Introduction
The default of a systemically important entity can have an impact on the rest of the econ-
omy through a number of different mechanisms. For instance, firms that have exposures
to the defaulted entity through market transactions, can experience a deterioration in
fundamentals driving the value of their assets. Under adverse circumstances this can lead
to a domino effect, where the default of one firm causes financial distress on entities with
which the firm had business relations. This distress can propagate through the financial
system causing a cascading failure, leading in the worst case to the collapse of a significant
portion of the system (the recent credit crisis being a clear example). In the context of
interbank lending, Giesecke and Weber (2006) propose a reduced form contagion model,
while Amini et al. (2010) and Amini et al. (2011) use tools from random graph theory to
analyze short term counterparty credit exposures. Dynamic contagion models are consid-
ered in Dai Pra et al. (2009), and more recently in Cvitanic´ et al. (2010) and Giesecke
et al. (2011).
Alternatively, there may be a purely informational effect, where the default of one firm
triggers the market participants to update their perception of the state of the economy. For
example, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) show that the unexpected default of an individual
firm can lead to a market-wide increase in credit spreads, and demonstrate via calibration
that the risk premium due to contagion risk may be considerable.
A third possibility is that the sudden shock associated with the default event leads to a re-
allocation of wealth as the economy returns to equilibrium. This may in turn cause rapid
price changes due to linkages that stem from the equality between supply and demand. The
aim of the present paper is to study this mechanism in a continuous time financial model,
including default risk, where prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
While models of economic equilibrium have been studied for a long time, it is only re-
cently that fully dynamic stochastic models of equilibrium have received significant at-
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tention. Dumas (1988) considers a dynamic equilibrium model with two investors, and
characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the wealth allocation and risk-free rate, assuming
that the stock returns are specified exogenously. Chabakauri (2010) considers a similar
economy, but allows for the possibility of portfolio constraints, and analyzes cyclicality
properties of market price of risk and stock return volatilities. Bhamra and Uppal (2009)
consider a continuous time economy populated by two power utility agents with heteroge-
nous beliefs and preferences, and give closed form expressions for consumption policies,
portfolio policies, and asset prices. The same model as in Bhamra and Uppal (2009) is
considered by Cvitanic et al. (2011) and Cvitanic and Malamud (2011a), who extend the
results by Bhamra and Uppal to the case of an arbitrary number of agents, including
an asymptotic analysis for large time horizons. Cvitanic and Malamud (2011b) provide
decompositions into myopic and non-myopic components for market price of risk, stock
volatility, and hedging strategies. In the same economic model, Wang (1996) studies how
investor preferences affect the term structure of interest rates.
The literature on dynamic equilibrium models, including the papers mentioned above, has
been concerned primarily with models where equilibrium prices have continuous paths.
This means that dramatic and sudden changes, such as crisis events or major defaults,
are absent—and indeed these papers have focused on other economic phenomena. An
exception is Hasler (2011), which considers a Lucas economy with multiple defaults, where
the default intensities are constant.
In the present paper we study a finite horizon continuous time model, where rational
investors maximize utility from terminal wealth. Three securities are liquidly and dynam-
ically traded: a money market represented by a locally risk-free security, i.e. investors
can borrow from or lend to each other without default, a stock representing shares of
the aggregate endowment, and a defaultable bond which represents the corporate bond
index (for example, the Dow Jones corporate bond index). We assume a constant recovery
model, in which case the default of the bond index is interpreted as the default of one (or
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more) of the index bonds, which reduces the total payment of the index. The intensity of
the defaultable bond may, but need not, depend on the dividend process.
As we demonstrate in the present paper, introducing a defaultable security in the economy
leads to new insights regarding the behavior of securities prices, market price of risk, and
wealth allocation. For instance, we find that the equilibrium price of the stock typically
jumps when default occurs, despite the fact that the underlying dividend process is entirely
unaffected by the default event. Moreover, the direction of the jump (up or down) depends
in a non-trivial way on the interplay between investor preferences and the cyclicality
properties of the default intensity. In particular, we show that upward jumps in the stock
price are possible if, roughly speaking, the default intensity is sufficiently counter-cyclical.
The precise statement is given in Theorem 2. We also show that a similar analysis, with
similar conclusions, can be carried out for the wealth processes of individual investors, see
Section 5. In this connection, we investigate how heterogeneity of preferences affects the
exposure to the default carried by the different investors.
Due to the possibility of default, there are two sources of risk in our model: diffusion
risk and jump risk. Using techniques from the theory of filtration expansions, which has
a long and successful history in credit risk modeling, we are able to guarantee market
completeness, even in the presence of jumps, see also Bielecki et al. (2006a) and Bielecki
et al. (2006b) for a detailed analysis of market completeness and replication strategies in
reduced form models of credit risk. This allows us to identify a unique market price of risk
process, corresponding to diffusion risk, and default risk premium process, corresponding
to jump risk. It turns out that the two quantities are intimately linked, see Proposition 2.
By means of a quite delicate mathematical analysis, these quantities are studied in the
case of constant interest rate and default intensity.
The most natural interpretation of the phenomena we study is as a form of systemic risk,
arising in an economy consisting of securities carrying both market and default risk. While
systemic risk effects generated from equilibrium models have been studied, for instance
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in Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000), these papers use static discrete time
models, exclusive of default, where the focus is on characterizing optimal risk sharing across
banks with different credit profiles, or belonging to different geographical sectors. Differ-
ently from most research efforts, our model exhibits an endogenous interaction between
the stock and the defaultable bond, which arises via the interplay between equilibrium
behavior of the investors and their risk preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic model.
Section 3 analyzes the market price of risk in equilibrium along with its behavior at the
default event. Section 4 characterizes the behavior of the equilibrium stock price at default
via a relation between cyclicality properties of short rate and default intensity, and investor
preferences. Section 5 performs a similar analysis for the wealth process of a risk-averse
agent, and, in the case of a power utility investor, provides monotonicity relations between
the size of the jump and the level of risk aversion. Section 6 concludes the paper. The
proofs of the necessary lemmas are deferred to the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Probabilistic Model
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space, supporting a standard Brownian motionB =
(Bt)0≤t≤T . Let F = (Ft)0≤t≤T be the augmented filtration generated by B, which satisfies
the usual hypotheses of completeness and right continuity. We use a standard construction
(also called Cox construction) of the default time τ , based on doubly stochastic point
processes, using a given nonnegative F adapted intensity process λ = (λt)0≤t≤T . To this
end, we assume the existence of an exponentially distributed random variable χ defined
on the probability space (Ω,F ,P), independent of the process B. The default time τ is
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then defined as
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λsds ≥ χ}.
The market filtration G = (Gt)0≤t≤T , which describes the information available to in-
vestors, is given by
Gt =
⋂
u>t
Fu ∨ σ(τ ∧ u).
That is, it contains all information in Ft, together with the knowledge of whether τ
has occurred or not, and has been made right-continuous. It is a well-known result (see
e.g. Bielecki and Rutkowski (2001), Section 6.5 for details) that the process
Mt = 1{τ≤t} −
∫ t∧τ
0
λsds
is a G-martingale under P. In other words, λ is the default intensity (or hazard rate)
of τ .
An important consequence of the previous construction is that Hypothesis (H) holds,
i.e. every F martingale remains a G martingale, see Bielecki and Rutkowski (2001). It
then follows from a result by Kusuoka (Theorem 5 in Appendix A) that every square
integrable G martingale may be represented as a stochastic integral with respect to M
and B.
2.2 The market model
We consider a market model, which is an extension of the standard setting in Cvitanic´ and
Malamud (2010). We assume that there is an underlying dividend process D = (Dt)0≤t≤T
with dynamics
dDt
Dt
= µD(Dt)dt+ σ
D(Dt)dBt, D0 > 0. (1)
It is assumed that µD : R+ → R and σD : R+ → R+ are such that a strictly positive, strong
solution exists. We also assume that µD and σD are infinitely differentiable on (0,∞),
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and that σD > 0.
There are two risky assets in the economy, a stock which carries market risk, and a
defaultable bond which carries default risk. At terminal time T , the stock pays a terminal
dividend DT , while the defaultable bond pays a terminal dividend PT . The latter is given
by
PT = 1{τ>T} + ε1{τ≤T}.
Here 0 < ε < 1 is a constant recovery value paid at time T in case default happens at or
before T . We assume that ε is deterministic, although many calculations would still be
valid as long as ε is FT -measurable. Neither the stock, nor the defaultable bond generates
any intermediate dividends. We also assume the existence of a locally risk free money-
market account with interest rate r = (rt)0≤t≤T . Finally, we assume that the default
intensity λt and interest rate rt are of the form
λt = λ(Dt) and rt = r(Dt)
for deterministic functions λ and r. The same assumption has also been used by Cvitanic´
and Malamud (2010) for the interest rate.
In our model, both the stock and the defaultable bond are positive net supply assets.
In contrast, the zero money-market account is assumed to be available in zero net sup-
ply.
The market price at time t of the stock is denoted by St, and that of the defaultable
bond by Pt. These processes are determined in equilibrium, and their dynamics is of the
form
dSt
St−
= µSt dt+ σ
S
t dBt + ρ
S
t dMt
dPt
Pt−
= µPt dt+ σ
P
t dBt + ρ
P
t dMt.
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The existence of such representations follows from Theorem 5 together with the fact that in
equilibrium, both St and Pt are semimartingales with absolutely continuous finite variation
parts. Furthermore, we conjecture that the matrix
σSt ρSt
σPt ρ
P
t

will be invertible in equilibrium. This immediately implies that the market is complete,
via application of Theorem 5. It is then well known, see e.g. Cvitanic´ and Zapatero (2004),
that there exists a unique state-price density process
ξ = (ξt)0≤t≤T .
The time t price of a payoff X received at time T is given by 1ξtE[ξTX | Gt].
2.3 The investors
There are a finite number of investors, indexed by k, who optimize expected utility from
final consumption. They are all assumed to have identical beliefs given by the histori-
cal probability P, but can have different utility functions Uk. These are assumed to be
twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfy Inada conditions at zero and
infinity:
lim
x↓0
U ′k(x) =∞ and limx→∞U
′
k(x) = 0.
Two important measures of risk aversion, which will be used extensively in this paper, are
the coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion, both defined in Pratt (1964). The
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is defined as
`U (x) = −d logU
′(x)
dx
= −U
′′(x)
U ′(x)
. (2)
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Pratt related this measure to the agent’s risk behavior by showing that an agent with utility
U(x) is more risk averse than an agent with utility V (x) if and only if `U (x) > `V (x) for
all x ≥ 0. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as
LU (x) = −d logU
′(x)
d log x
= −xU
′′(x)
U ′(x)
. (3)
The k:th investor chooses a dynamic portfolio strategy pik = (pi
S
kt, pi
P
kt)0≤t≤T , a G pre-
dictable and (S, P )-integrable process, where piSkt is the proportion of wealth invested in
the stock at time t, and piPkt is the proportion of wealth invested in the defaultable bond.
The remaining wealth is invested in the money market account to make the strategy self-
financing. The investor must choose his strategy so that the corresponding wealth process,
given by
dWkt
Wkt−
= rtdt+ pi
S
kt
(dSt
St−
− rtdt
)
+ piPkt
(dPt
Pt−
− rtdt
)
, (4)
stays strictly positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The portfolio strategy pik is chosen to maximize the
expected utility
E [Uk(WkT )] .
Market completeness allows one to use standard duality methods (see Cvitanic´ and Mala-
mud (2010)) to show that the optimal final wealth in equilibrium is given by
WkT = Ik(ykξT ), (5)
where the number yk is the solution to the budget constraint equation,
E [Ik(ykξT )ξT ] = Wk0.
Moreover, the wealth at times t < T is given by
Wkt =
E[ξTWkT | Gt]
ξt
. (6)
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2.4 The equilibrium
We employ the usual notion of equilibrium:
Definition 1 The market is said to be in equilibrium if each investor behaves optimally
and all the securities markets clear.
Again by market completeness, standard equilibrium theory, see Constantinides (1982),
shows that security prices coincide with those in an artificial economy populated by a
single, representative investor. We denote the corresponding utility function by U , and
assume that U is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfies Inada
conditions at zero and infinity. The state-price density is then given by
ξT = U
′(DT + PT ). (7)
Furthermore,
ξt = e
− ∫ t0 rsdsZt,
where Z is the Radon-Nikodym density process corresponding to the (unique) risk-neutral
measure Q,
Zt =
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Gt
= E
[
e
∫ T
0 rsdsξT | Gt
]
.
Using Equation (7), the definition of DT and PT , and Lemma 4 in Appendix A, we can
separate the state price density into a pre- and post-default component. More precisely,
we have
ξt = 1{τ>t}ξ
pre
t + 1{τ≤t}ξ
post
t ,
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where
ξpostt = E
[
e
∫ T
t rsdsU ′(DT + ε)
∣∣∣∣Ft]
ξpret = E
[(
1− e−
∫ T
t λsds
)
e
∫ T
t rsdsU ′(DT + ε)
+ e−
∫ T
t λsdse
∫ T
t rsdsU ′(DT + 1)
∣∣∣∣Ft]. (8)
Remark. Assume that the intensity λt is deterministic and, for simplicity, that rt ≡ 0.
We then have
ξpret = P(τ ≤ T |τ > t)E[U ′(DT + ε) | Ft] + P(τ > T |τ > t)E[U ′(DT + 1) | Ft],
indicating that the pre-default state price density is the weighted average of the state price
density in an economy where default will surely happen, and the state price density in a
default-free economy. The weights are, respectively, the probability that default will, or
will not, take place before T , given that it has not occurred up to time t.
The equilibrium market price processes are computed using the state price density ξt.
They are given by
St =
E[ξTDT | Gt]
ξt
= EQ
[
e−
∫ T
t ruduDT | Gt
]
(9)
Pt =
E[ξTPT | Gt]
ξt
= EQ
[
e−
∫ T
t ruduPT | Gt
]
.
Therefore, again relying on Lemma 4 in Appendix A, we obtain
St = 1{τ>t}S
pre
t + 1{τ≤t}S
post
t , (10)
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where
Spostt =
1
ξpostt
E
[
DTU
′(DT + )
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Spret =
1
ξpret
E
[(
1− e−
∫ T
t λsds
)
DTU
′(DT + ) + e−
∫ T
t λsdsDTU
′(DT + 1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] .
(11)
3 Equilibrium market price of risk
In this section we derive expressions for the market price of (diffusion and default) risk, as
well as the risk premium of the stock. The risk premium is defined as the excess growth
rate of the asset above the risk-free rate, namely µSt − rt.
By Theorem 5 the density process Z associated with the risk-neutral measure has the
representation
dZt
Zt−
= −θtdBt + κtdMt
for some G predictable processes θ and κ. An application of Girsanov’s theorem shows
that
BQt = Bt +
∫ t
0
θsds and M
Q
t = Mt −
∫ t∧τ
0
κsλsds
are (G,Q) local martingales, and in particular BQ is (G,Q) Brownian motion. Note that
we can write
MQt = 1{τ≤t} −
∫ t∧τ
0
λs(1 + κs)ds,
so that the risk-neutral default intensity is given by λQt = λt(1 + κt). The quantity κt
is called the default risk premium, and θt is called the market price of risk. We fix this
notation from now on.
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Proposition 1 The market price of risk is given by
θt = θ
pre
t 1{τ≥t} + θ
post
t 1{τ<t},
where −θpre is the volatility of ξpre, and −θpost is the volatility of ξpost. The default risk
premium is given by
κt =
ξpostt
ξpret
− 1.
The risk premium associated with the stock, or the equity risk premium, is given by
µSt − rt = σSt θt −
(
Spostt
Spret
− 1
)(
ξpostt
ξpret
− 1
)
λt1{τ≥t}.
Proof. The assertions concerning θ and κ follow from Lemma 5 and the definition of θt
and κt, since ξt = e
− ∫ t0 rsdsZt. Let us establish the expression for the risk premium. The
relations between B and BQ, respectively M and MQ, together with the P-dynamics of
the stock price yield
dSt
St−
=
[
µSt − σSt θt + ρSt κtλt1{τ≥t}
]
dt+ σSt dB
Q
t + ρ
S
t dM
Q
t .
The drift term equals rtdt since the discounted stock price is a martingale under Q. The
proof follows by substituting the expressions for κt and ρ
S
t into the above equation (the
latter follows from Lemma 5.)
Remark. The risk premium can alternatively be expressed in terms of the risk-neutral
default intensity λQt , using that λ
Q
t = λt(1 + κt). The result is
µSt − rt = σtθt −
(
Spostt
Spret
− 1
)(
1− ξ
pre
t
ξpostt
)
λQt 1{τ≥t}.
It is clear from the definition of ξpret and ξ
post
t that we always have ξ
pre
t ≤ ξpostt . The
contribution to the equity risk premium coming from default risk therefore has the same
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sign as Spret − Spostt . This quantity is minus the size of the jump in the stock price, were
default to happen at time t. In particular, if the stock price jumps down at default, then
the investors require a premium for holding the stock, as they want to be compensated for
the loss incurred upon default. On the other hand, if the stock jumps up at default, then
it becomes an attractive security to hold, and therefore the investors are willing to pay a
premium for holding it. We will study the sign of the jump in more detail in Section 4;
suffice it to say here that positive price jumps, while atypical, are indeed possible.
There is an interesting relationship between the sensitivity of κt with respect to changes
in the level of the dividend process, and the market price of diffusion risk. To state the
result, first observe that the Markovian structure allows us to write
κt = κ(t,Dt)
for some measurable function κ(t, x). We now have
Proposition 2 The function κ is differentiable, and the derivative κx =
∂κ
∂x is given by
κx(t,Dt) = − 1
DtσD(Dt)
ξpostt
ξpret
(
θpostt − θpret
)
Proof. As for κt, the Markovian structure allows us to write ξ
i
t = ξ
i(t,Dt) for i ∈
{pre, post} and measurable functions ξi(t, x). As in the proof of Theorem 1 below, we may
apply Theorem 6.1 in Janson and Tysk (2006) to obtain the smoothness of ξi, and hence
of κ since κ = ξ
post
ξpre − 1 by Proposition 1. Differentiating this relation yields
κx =
ξpost
ξpre
(
ξpostx
ξpost
− ξ
pre
x
ξpre
)
.
Now, the volatility of a positive F adapted semimartingale of the form u(t,Dt) is given
by uxu (t,Dt)Dtσ
D(Dt), as can be seen from Itoˆ’s formula. By Proposition 1, θ
i is equal to
minus the volatility of ξi, which yields the result.
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Observe that θpostt − θpret is the size of the jump in θ, if default were to occur at time t.
Proposition 2 shows in particular that if this quantity is positive, the default risk premium
moves in the opposite direction to the dividend: an increase in the dividend process is
accompanied by a decrease in the default risk premium, and vice versa. This appears to
suggest that, upon default, a risk averse investor who sees an upward jump in the market
price of risk, prefers to shift wealth from the risky stock to a default-free bond, giving a
sure payoff of  at maturity. If, on the other hand, θpostt − θpret is negative, the default risk
premium moves in the same direction as the dividend.
We proceed to study how the market price of risk θt behaves at default. As we have just
seen, this also provides information about the sensitivity of the default risk premium κt to
changes in Dt. The following result unfortunately requires us to assume constant interest
rate and constant default intensity—already in this case the analysis is non-trivial (in
particular it is much more delicate than for the jump in the stock price.) Extending it to
more general r and λ is an interesting problem that we leave for future research.
Theorem 1 Assume that the interest rate and default intensity are constant. If the rep-
resentative investor has a strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the market price
of risk has a nonnegative jump at τ .
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1. First, let us introduce some
notation. For each α > 0, define the function
uα(t, x) = E[U ′(DT + α) | Dt = x].
Using, for instance, Theorem 6.1 in Janson and Tysk (2006), we deduce that uα satisfies
the PDE
uαt +
1
2
x2σD(x)2uαxx + xµ
D(x)uαx = 0, u
α(T, x) = U ′(x+ α),
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. Standard results then imply that uα has
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the same degree of smoothness as σD and µD on (0, T ) × (0,∞), see e.g. Theorem 10 in
Chapter 3 of Friedman (2008). Since we assume that σD and µD are infinitely differen-
tiable, the same holds for uα.
Proof of Theorem 1. Due to Lemma 1 below, the theorem will be proved once we
establish that the quantity
− ∂
∂x
log uα(t, x)
is decreasing in α. This is done in two stages: Lemma 2 gives the result when D is
bounded, and Lemma 3 then extends this to unbounded D.
Lemma 1 Assume that the interest rate and default intensity are constant. If
−u
ε
x(t, x)
uε(t, x)
> −u
1
x(t, x)
u1(t, x)
for all (t, x) ∈ (0, T ]× R+, then ∆θτ > 0 on {τ ≤ T}.
Proof. It follows from (8) and the assumption of constant r and λ that
ξpostt = e
r(T−t)uε(t,Dt)
and
ξpret = e
r(T−t)
(
(1− e−λ(T−t))uε(t,Dt) + e−λ(T−t)u1(t,Dt)
)
.
The volatility of a positive F adapted semimartingale of the form u(t,Dt) is given by
ux
u (t,Dt)Dtσ
D(Dt), as can be seen from Itoˆ’s formula. By Proposition 1 and the above
expressions for ξpret and ξ
post
t it then follows that
θpostt = −
uεx(t,Dt)
uε(t,Dt)
Dtσ
D(Dt)
and
θpret = −
(1− e−λ(T−t))uεx(t,Dt) + e−λ(T−t)u1x(t,Dt)
(1− e−λ(T−t))uε(t,Dt) + e−λ(T−t)u1(t,Dt)
Dtσ
D(Dt).
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A calculation using that uε and u1 are strictly positive reveals that θpostt > θ
pre
t if and only
if
−u
ε
x(t,Dt)
uε(t,Dt)
> −u
1
x(t,Dt)
u1(t,Dt)
.
The result now follows.
Lemma 2 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Assume also that there
is a constant C > 0 such that σD(x) = 0 and µD(x) = 0 for all x /∈ (C−1, C). Then
− ∂
∂x
log uα(t, x)
is strictly decreasing in α.
Proof. Define u˜α = log uα. It can be readily verified that u˜α satisfies the terminal value
problem
u˜αt +
1
2
x2σD(x)2u˜αxx + xµ
D(x)u˜αx +
1
2
x2σD(x)2(u˜αx)
2 = 0,
u˜α(T, x) = logU ′(x+ α).
Now define vα = −u˜αx = − ∂∂x log uα, and differentiate the above equation with respect to
x to see that vα satisfies the nonlinear PDE
vαt +
1
2
x2σD(x)2vαxx +
(
xµD(x) +
1
2
[x2σD(x)2]x
)
vαx
+ [xµD(x)]xv
α − 1
2
[x2σD(x)2(vα)2]x = 0,
with terminal condition
vα(T, x) = −U
′′(x+ α)
U ′(x+ α)
= `U (x+ α).
Let us pick β < α, and define w = vβ − vα. We want to prove that w > 0. The function
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w satisfies the terminal value problem
wt +
1
2
a(x)wxx + b(t, x)wx + c(t, x)w = 0 (12)
w(T, x) = `U (x+ β)− `U (x+ α),
where
a(x) = x2σD(x)2
b(t, x) = xµD(x) +
1
2
[x2σD(x)2]x − 1
2
x2σD(x)2(vα(t, x) + vβ(t, x))
c(t, x) =
[
xµD(x)− 1
2
x2σD(x)2(vα(t, x) + vβ(t, x))
]
x
.
Notice that w(T, x) > 0, as we are assuming that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
`U is strictly decreasing. Moreover, the coefficients a, b and c are smooth due to the
smoothness of µD, σD, vα and vβ. The latter functions are smooth since they are the
derivatives of the logarithm of the infinitely differentiable functions uα and uβ.
Now, let X = (Xt)0≤t≤T be the solution to the SDE
dXt =
√
a(Xt)dBt + b(t,Xt)dt, X0 = D0.
The smoothness of a and b implies that a unique strong solution exists up to an explosion
time, but since σD(x) = 0 and µD(x) = 0 for all x /∈ (C−1, C), we have a(x) = 0 and
b(t, x) = 0 there, so no explosion can occur. Indeed, C−1 ≤ Xt ≤ C holds for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
almost surely.
Next, define a process Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T by
Yt = e
∫ t
0 c(s,Xs)dsw(t,Xt).
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Itoˆ’s formula and the fact that w satisfies (12) show that
dYt = e
∫ t
0 c(s,Xs)dswx(t,Xt)
√
a(Xt)dBt,
and since Xt remains in a compact set and a, c and wx are continuous, the integrand
in front of dBt is bounded. Therefore Y is a martingale, and its final value is YT =
e
∫ T
0 c(s,Xs)dsw(T,XT ) > 0 due to the boundary condition of w. We deduce that Yt > 0 for
every t almost surely, and hence that w > 0, as desired.
Lemma 3 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Then
− ∂
∂x
log uα(t, x)
is nonincreasing in α.
Proof. Fix β > α. The goal is to show that −uαx/uα ≥ −uβx/uβ. For each n ∈ N, let
µn and σn be infinitely differentiable and coincide with µD, respectively σD, on [n−1, n],
while being zero outside the interval [(n+1)−1, n+1]. Denote by Dn the solution to
dDnt
Dnt
= µn(Dnt )dt+ σ
n(Dnt )dBt, D
n
0 = D0,
and define uα,n(t, x) = E [U ′(DnT + α) | Dnt = x]. An application of Lemma 2 shows
that
−u
α,n
x
uα,n
> −u
β,n
x
uβ,n
for each n. It thus suffices to prove that uα,n → uα and uα,nx → uαx pointwise. The
latter follows from the former using interior Schauder estimates, for instance by apply-
ing the corollary of Theorem 15 in Chapter 3 of Friedman (2008) on each subdomain
[0, T ) × (m−1,m), m ≥ 2 (using the PDE representation of uα,n, and noticing that on
each subdomain the coefficients of the parabolic operator associated to uα,n are Ho¨lder
continuous, and x2σn(x)2 is bounded away from zero for all sufficiently large n.)
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To prove that uα,n(t, x)→ uα(t, x), first note that uα,n(t, x) = E [U ′(DnT−t + α) | Dn0 = x]
and uα(t, x) = E [U ′(DT−t + α) | D0 = x] by the Markov property. Since U ′(· + α) is
bounded, the desired convergence follows from the Bounded Convergence Theorem if
DnT−t → DT−t almost surely, with Dn0 = D0 = x. But this is clear: pathwise unique-
ness and the construction of µn and σn imply that D and Dn coincide on the event
An = {n−1 ≤ Ds ≤ n for all 0 ≤ s ≤ T − t},
so DnT−t = DT−t1An +D
n
T−t1Acn . Since P(An)→ 1, DnT−t → DT−t almost surely, and the
proof is finished.
4 Equilibrium stock price
In this section we are interested in how the market price of the stock changes when default
occurs. If τ < T , there may be a jump in the stock price at τ . Under certain cyclicality
assumptions on the default intensity and the interest rate, it turns out that the sign of
the jump must be negative. On the other hand, in specific circumstances it can happen
that the jump is positive. The following results gives the precise conditions. The proofs
rely on a number of lemmas, which are stated and proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 2 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical, and that the representative
investor has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, as well as relative risk aversion
bounded by one. Define
g(t, x) = E[e−
∫ T
t λudu | DT = x] and φ(x) = 1− U
′(x+ 1)
U ′(x+ ε)
. (13)
Then the following hold.
(i) If φ(x)g(t, x) is strictly increasing in x for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the stock price has a
strictly positive jump at τ .
20
(ii) If φ(x)g(t, x) is strictly decreasing in x for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the stock price has a
strictly negative jump at τ .
Proof. Equations (8), (10) and (11) show that the jump in the stock price is given
by
∆Sτ =
at
ct
− at − bt
ct − dt
∣∣∣∣∣
t=τ
on {0 < τ ≤ T}, (14)
where
at = E
[
DTU
′(DT + ε) | Ft
]
bt = E
[
e−
∫ T
t λuduDT (U
′(DT + ε)− U ′(DT + 1)) | Ft
]
ct = E
[
e
∫ T
t ruduU ′(DT + ε) | Ft
]
dt = E
[
e
∫ T
t (ru−λu)du(U ′(DT + ε)− U ′(DT + 1)) | Ft
)
.
Using that ξpret = ct − dt and Spostt = atct , elementary manipulations yields
∆Sτ =
1
ξpret
[
Covt
(
e−
∫ T
t λuduφ(DT ), DTU
′(DT + ε)
)
− Spostt Covt
(
e−
∫ T
t λuduφ(DT ), e
∫ T
t ruduU ′(DT + ε)
)]
t=τ
on {0 < τ ≤ T}, where Covt denotes Ft-conditional covariance, and φ is defined in (13).
It suffices to analyze the two covariances, since both ξpret and S
post
t are strictly positive.
Let us fix t. By the Markov property of D (and using that rt = r(Dt) and λt = λ(Dt)),
we may without loss of generality assume that t = 0 (and think of T as T − t), as long as
the starting point D0 > 0 is allowed to be arbitrary.
By conditioning on DT , we find
Cov
(
e−
∫ T
0 λuduφ(DT ), DTU
′(DT + ε)
)
= Cov
(
g(DT )φ(DT ), DTU
′(DT + ε)
)
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and
Cov
(
e−
∫ T
0 λuduφ(DT ), e
∫ T
0 ruduU ′(DT + ε)
)
= Cov
(
g(DT )φ(DT ), f(DT )U
′(DT + ε)
)
,
where f(x) = E[e
∫ T
0 rudu | D0 = x], and g(x) = g(0, x) is given in (13). Since r is counter-
cyclical, f is decreasing by Lemma 6, and hence x 7→ f(x)U ′(x + ε) is also decreasing.
Moreover, the function ψ(x) = xU ′(x+ε) has a derivative ψ′(x) = U ′(x+ε)+xU ′′(x+ε),
which is strictly greater than zero if and only if
1 > −xU
′′(x+ ε)
U ′(x+ ε)
= − x
x+ ε
(x+ ε)U ′′(x+ ε)
U ′(x+ ε)
=
x
x+ ε
LU (x+ ε).
This is indeed the case since the relative risk aversion is less than or equal to one. Thus
ψ is strictly increasing.
Under the assumption of (i), g(x)φ(x) is strictly increasing, so the first covariance is
strictly positive, while the second is strictly negative. This uses the fact that for posi-
tive, strictly increasing functions h1 and h2, and any non-constant random variable X,
Cov(h1(X), h2(X)) > 0, while if h2 is strictly decreasing, Cov(h1(X), h2(X)) < 0.
Under the assumption of (ii) that g(x)φ(x) is strictly decreasing, the situation reverses
and the jump becomes strictly negative.
We also provide the following result, which shows that the stock price jump will be negative
under more general conditions than those of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity
pro-cyclical. If the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
the stock price has a strictly negative jump at τ .
Proof. Let at, bt, ct and dt be as in the proof of Theorem 2. From Equation (14) we see
that a sufficient condition for having a strictly negative jump is that atdt− btct > 0 for all
t ≤ T . As in the proof of Theorem 2 it suffices to consider t = 0.
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By Lemma 8 and the cyclicality of r and λ, we have
E
[
e
∫ T
0 (ru−λu)du | DT
]
≥ E
[
e
∫ T
0 rudu | DT
]
E
[
e−
∫ T
0 λudu | DT
]
.
Therefore, with f(x) = E[e
∫ T
0 rudu | DT = x] and g(x) = E[e−
∫ T
0 λudu | DT = x], we obtain
by conditioning on DT that
a0d0 − b0c0 ≥ E
[
U ′(DT + ε)DT
]
E
[
f(DT )g(DT )U
′(DT + ε)φ(DT )
]
− E [f(DT )U ′(DT + ε)]E [f(DT )U ′(DT + ε)DTφ(DT )] .
Here φ(x) is again given by (13). The derivative of φ is
φ′(x) =
U ′(x+ 1)
U ′(x+ ε)
[
`U (x+ 1)− `U (x+ ε)
]
, (15)
which is strictly negative since the absolute risk aversion is assumed to be strictly decreas-
ing. Therefore φ is strictly decreasing. Moreover, by Lemma 8 and the cyclicality of r and
λ, the functions f and g are decreasing. They are also strictly positive. Hence
(
xf(y)g(y)φ(y)− f(x)f(y)yφ(y)
)
+
(
yf(x)g(x)φ(x)− f(y)f(x)xφ(x)
)
= f(x)f(y)
(
x
f(x)
− y
f(x)
)(
g(y)φ(y)− g(x)φ(x)
)
> 0
for x 6= y. Observing that DT has no atoms and U ′(x+ ε) > 0, Lemma 9 then yields that
a0d0 − b0c0 > 0, as desired.
Naively one might expect the jump in the stock price always to be negative, for the
following reason. The default event leads to an instantaneous drop in the aggregate wealth
in the economy. If the representative investor has a decreasing absolute risk aversion,
this should lead to a reduced demand for the risky asset (after default, the stock is the
only risky asset). This in turn forces the stock price down so that market clearing is
maintained.
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Such an argument supposes that the stock price jump is exclusively a wealth effect. How-
ever, when the default intensity is stochastic, there is also a “non-myopic” effect orig-
inating from expected future co-movements of the default intensity and the dividend
process. Specifically, if the default intensity is highly counter-cyclical, and the current
(pre-default) value of the dividend process is low, then even a moderate expected future
dividend increase is coupled with a dramatic future reduction in the default intensity. The
representative investor, in anticipation of the reduced risk of default, may then wish to
shift wealth to the defaultable bond. This causes a downward pressure on the stock price,
pushing it below what would be its fundamental value, were there no defaultable bond in
the economy. When the default occurs, this downward pressure vanishes, and the stock
price jumps up.
Of course, the same reasoning could be used for very high values of the dividend process to
argue that the jump would be negative in these cases. Consistent with this observation, we
have found that the function x 7→ φ(x)g(t, x) appearing in Theorem 2 becomes decreasing
for large values of x, even in examples where λ is highly counter-cyclical. In such cases the
price jump will still be (mostly) positive on simulated paths, if the probability is sufficiently
small that Dt ever reaches the high levels where the function is decreasing.
We end this section with a numerical case study to support the argument just made.
Specifically, we assume that the dividend process in Equation (1) is a geometric Brownian
motion, i.e. µD(x) = µ and σD(x) = σ. Using time reversal of diffusions, see Lemma 10
in Appendix B, we may write
g(x) = E
[
e−
∫ T
0 λ(D˜u)du
∣∣∣∣D˜0 = x] ,
where the process D˜ satisfies the SDE
dD˜t = µ˜(t, D˜t)dt+ σD˜tdWt (16)
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Figure 1: Plot of the function φ(x)g(x).
with
µ˜(t, x) = −µx+ 1
σ
(
µ− 1
2
σ2 − log(x/D0)
T − t
)
. (17)
We set µ = −0.2, σ = 0.3, D0 = 1, r = 0.03, and use a strongly counter-cyclical default
intensity given by λ(x) = 9e−x. Further, we choose a logarithmic utility function given by
U(x) = log(x). Under these choices of parameters, we estimated via Monte-Carlo simula-
tion that at the default time the stock experiences a positive jump of size 0.001.
We estimate g(x) via Monte-Carlo simulations using (16) and (17), and report the behavior
of φ(x)g(x) in Figure 1. We see that this function is initially increasing, and it only starts
decreasing for sufficiently large values of x (x > 9). However, the probability that the
geometric Brownian motion with negative drift reaches those values before time T , given
that it starts at 1, is extremely low.
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5 Wealth processes
The jump in an individual agent’s wealth can be analyzed using the same techniques as for
the stock price. Starting from Equations (5) and (6), and using Lemma 4 in Appendix A,
the wealth of the k:th investor can be decomposed into a pre- and post-default term. The
result is
Wkt = 1{τ>t}W
pre
kt + 1{τ≤t}W
post
kt ,
where
W postkt =
1
ξpostt
E[U ′(DT + ε)Ik(ykU ′(DT + ε)) | Ft]
W prekt =
1
ξpret
E
[(
1− e−
∫ T
t λsds
)
U ′(DT + )Ik(ykU ′(DT + ε))
+ e−
∫ T
t λsdsU ′(DT + 1)Ik(ykU ′(DT + 1))
∣∣∣∣Ft].
The jump in wealth is then ∆Wkτ = W
post
kτ − W prekτ on {τ ≤ T}. The following result
shows that the condition of Theorem 3 is also sufficient to ensure a negative jump in
wealth. Unfortunately, the structure of the final value of the wealth process prevents us
from obtaining a simple condition to guarantee a positive jump. (The reason is that, in
contrast to the stock, WkT cannot be expressed as ξT times an FT -measurable random
variable.)
Theorem 4 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity
pro-cyclical. If the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
every agent’s wealth process has a strictly negative jump at τ .
Proof. We consider the k:th investor, so let us fix k. The proof follows along the same
lines as that of Theorem 3. The jump in wealth is
∆Wkτ =
akt
ct
− a
k
t − bkt
ct − dt
∣∣∣∣∣
t=τ
on {τ ≤ T}, (18)
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where
akt = E
[
U ′(DT + ε)ιk(DT + ε) | Ft
]
bkt = E
[
e−
∫ T
t λudu(U ′(DT + ε)ιk(DT + ε)− U ′(DT + 1)ιk(DT + 1)) | Ft
]
ct = E
[
e
∫ T
t ruduU ′(DT + ε) | Ft
]
dt = E
[
e
∫ T
t (ru−λu)du(U ′(DT + ε)− U ′(DT + 1)) | Ft
]
,
and ιk(x) = Ik(ykU
′(x)). As in the proof of Theorem 3, it suffices to prove that ak0d0 −
bk0c0 > 0. To make the notation less cluttered we write D = DT , R =
∫ T
0 rudu, Λ =∫ T
0 λudu. As before, φ(x) = 1 − U
′(x+1)
U ′(x+ε) . Since both Ik and U
′ are decreasing, ιk is
increasing. Hence
ak0d0 − bk0c0 ≥ E
[
U ′(D + ε)ιk(D + ε)
]
E
[
eR−ΛU ′(D + ε)φ(D)
]
− E [e−ΛU ′(D + ε)ιk(D + ε)φ(D)]E [eRU ′(D + ε)] .
The cyclicality of r and λ implies, via Lemma 8, that
E[eR−Λ | D] ≥ E[eR | D]E[e−Λ | D].
Therefore, with f(x) = E[eR | D = x] and g(x) = E[e−Λ | D = x], we obtain by
conditioning on D that
ak0d0 − bk0c0 ≥ E
[
U ′(D + ε)ιk(D + ε)
]
E
[
f(D)g(D)U ′(D + ε)φ(D)
]
− E [g(D)U ′(D + ε)ιk(D + ε)φ(D)]E [f(D)U ′(D + ε)] .
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Now, the cyclicality of r and λ together with Lemma 6 shows that f and g are decreasing.
Since also f is strictly positive, φ is strictly decreasing, and ιk is increasing, we have
(
ιk(x+ ε)f(y)g(y)φ(y)− g(x)ιk(x+ ε)φ(x)f(y)
)
+
(
ιk(y + ε)f(x)g(x)φ(x)− g(y)ιk(y + ε)φ(y)f(x)
)
= f(x)f(y)
(
φ(y)g(y)− φ(x)g(x)
)( 1
f(x)
ιk(x+ ε)− 1
f(y)
ιk(y + ε)
)
> 0
for x 6= y. The positivity of a0d0 − b0c0 now follows by Lemma 9, since U ′(x+ ε) > 0 and
D has no atoms.
5.1 Jump sizes under power utility
We now investigate how the size of the jump is affected by the risk aversion of the agents.
For this, we assume that all agents in the economy have power utility with relative risk
aversion γk ∈ (0, 1]. That is,
Uk(x) =
x1−γk
1− γk ,
which should be interpreted as Uk(x) = log(x) when γk = 1. We then have
U ′k(x) = x
−γk and Ik(y) = y−1/γk .
The following result gives a condition under which a more risk averse investor will suffer
a smaller jump in wealth than one who is less risk averse.
Proposition 3 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity
pro-cyclical, and that the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Consider two agents k and ` with γk ≥ γ`. If
E
[
e−
∫ T
t λuduU ′(DT + 1)1−1/γk | Ft
]
E
[
U ′(DT + ε)1−1/γk | Ft
] ≤ E
[
e−
∫ T
t λuduU ′(DT + 1)1−1/γ` | Ft
]
E
[
U ′(DT + ε)1−1/γ` | Ft
] (19)
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for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , then ∣∣∣∣∆WkτWkτ−
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∆W`τW`τ−
∣∣∣∣ .
If λ is constant, the statement remains true also in the case where both inequalities are
reversed.
Proof. Let akt , b
k
t , ct, dt be as in the proof of Theorem 4. If Wk jumps at t, we have
∆Wkt
Wkt−
=
ct − dt
akt − bkt
(
akt
ct
− a
k
t − bkt
ct − dt
)
=
ct − dt
ct
akt
akt − bkt
− 1,
and this is negative by Theorem 4 (this is the only place where the counter-cyclicality of
r is needed.) Hence
∣∣∣∣∆WkτWkτ−
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣∆W`τW`τ−
∣∣∣∣ = ct − dtct
(
a`t
a`t − b`t
− a
k
t
akt − bkt
)
,
and this is nonpositive if and only if a`tb
k
t ≥ akt b`t. As in the proof of Theorem 2 it is enough
to consider t = 0. Let us define νk = 1−1/γk and ν` = 1−1/γ`. The assumption of power
utility implies that
U ′(x)Ik(ykU ′(x)) = y
−1/γk
k U
′(x)νk ,
and hence, with D = DT and Λ =
∫ T
0 λsds,
a`0b
k
0 − ak0b`0 = y−1/γkk y−1/γ``
(
E
[
U ′(D + ε)ν`
]
E
[
e−ΛU ′(D + ε)νk
]
− E [e−ΛU ′(D + ε)ν`]E [U ′(D + ε)νk]
+ E
[
U ′(D + ε)νk
]
E
[
e−ΛU ′(D + 1)ν`
]
− E [e−ΛU ′(D + 1)νk]E [U ′(D + ε)ν`] ).
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The result follows once we prove that the first difference inside the parentheses is nonneg-
ative, i.e.,
E
[
U ′(D + ε)ν`
]
E
[
e−ΛU ′(D + ε)νk
] ≥ E [e−ΛU ′(D + ε)ν`]E [U ′(D + ε)νk] , (20)
where by conditioning on D we may replace e−Λ by g(D) = E[e−Λ | D]. Since γk ≥ γ`,
we have δ = νk − ν` ≥ 0. Moreover, since U ′ and g are both decreasing (the latter due to
Lemma 6 and the pro-cyclicality of λ), we have that
U ′(x+ ε)ν`U ′(y + ε)ν`
(
U ′(y + ε)δ − U ′(x+ ε)δ
)(
g(y)− g(x)
)
≥ 0.
Thus, it is enough to apply Lemma 8 to establish (20), which completes the proof for
non-constant λ. The last assertion is readily deduced upon noting that equality holds
in (20) if λ is constant.
As a corollary we obtain that in an economy populated exclusively by investors with power
utilities and logarithmic utilities, those with logarithmic utilities will suffer the smallest
relative jump in wealth.
Corollary 1 Assume that the interest rate is counter-cyclical and the default intensity
constant, and that the representative agent has strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Consider two agents k and `. If γk = 1, i.e. the k:th investor has log-utility, then
∣∣∣∣∆WkτWkτ−
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∆W`τW`τ−
∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. If λ is constant and γk = 1, the inequality (19) reduces to
E
[
U ′(DT + 1)1−1/γ` | Ft
]
≥ E
[
U ′(DT + ε)1−1/γ` | Ft
]
.
This is satisfied since U ′(x)1−1/γ` is increasing in x, so Proposition 3 applies.
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5.2 Measures of Systemic Risk
Based on the analysis done in the previous sections, we suggest two measures to quantify
the amount of systemic risk at time t in our economy. These are given by
%Wt =
1
N
∑N
k=1(W
pre
kt −W postkt )
Pt − ε ,
%St =
Spret − Spostt
Pt − ε .
Here Spret − Spostt corresponds to the drop in the stock price, and W prekt −W postkt to the
drop in the wealth of the k:th investor, if default were to happen at time t. Note that
the measures are positive if the drop is positive (the jump is downward). The measure %St
measures the impact a default would have on the stock, under the scenario that a default
is imminent. The measure, %Wt , instead, quantifies the impact that default would have
on the aggregate wealth of the economy, under the same scenario. Both measures can be
interpreted as the number of dollars lost by the stock (respectively by the portfolio of the
“average” investor in the economy) for each dollar lost by the corporate bond at time t,
in case default occurs at t. Notice that the two measures convey different information.
While %St depends on the interplay between cyclicality properties of the default intensity
and interest rate, and the risk aversion of the representative investor, %Wt also accounts for
the aggregate level of risk aversion in the economy. We postpone the characterization of
the dependence of these measures on the market and default risk parameters of our model
for future research.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a novel framework where a stock and a defaultable bond interact en-
dogenously through equilibrium mechanisms. Our market consists of a money market
account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, which are related to each other only through
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an underlying dividend process, whose dynamics is unaffected by the default event. The
price processes of the stock and of the defaultable bond are determined endogenously in
equilibrium. We analyzed in detail the impact of the default event on the stock price,
market price of risk, default risk premium, and investor wealth processes, as well as the
relations between them. We found that the equilibrium price of the stock typically jumps
at default. As the default event has no casual impact on the dividend process, this re-
sults in a form of endogenous interaction between the stock and the defaultable bond.
We have characterized the direction of the jump of the stock price at default in terms of
investor preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity, showing that up-
wards jumps are possible when the default intensity is sufficiently counter-cyclical. Under
the assumption of pro-cyclical default intensity and counter-cyclical interest rate, we have
shown that the wealth process of the representative investor jumps down upon default,
and that power utility investors will suffer a smaller relative jump in wealth if they are
more risk averse. Based on the analysis done in the paper, we have suggested two possible
measures to quantify systemic risk. In the future, we would like to extend our results to an
economy consisting of multiple defaultable securities, and analyze how default correlations
and cyclicality properties of the model parameters impact the price of the securities and
the aggregate wealth in the economy.
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A Results relating to filtration expansion
Theorem 5 (Martingale representation in G) For every square integrable G martin-
gale N there are G predictable processes (at)0≤t≤T and (bt)0≤t≤T , such that
E
(∫ T
0
|as|2ds
)
<∞, E
(∫ T
0
|bs|2λsds
)
<∞,
and
Nt = N0 +
∫ t
0
asdBs +
∫ t
0
bsdMs.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.3 in Kusuoka (1999), since every F martingale
remains a G martingale.
The following result is crucial in that it allows us to reduce Gt-conditional expectations to
Ft-conditional expectations. This type of result is classical in credit risk modeling.
Lemma 4 Let X = X11{τ>T}+X21{τ≤T}, where X1 and X2 are integrable FT -measurable
random variables. Then
E
[
X | Gt
]
= 1{τ≤t}E
[
X2 | Ft
]
+ 1{τ>t}E
[(
1− e−
∫ T
t λsds
)
X2 + e−
∫ T
t λsdsX1 | Ft
]
Proof. First note that
X = X2 − 1{τ>T}(X2 −X1).
Since Hypothesis (H) holds between F and G, any F martingale N satisfies E[NT | Gt] =
Nt = E[NT | Ft]. Apply this with Nt = E[X2 | Ft], whose final value is NT = X2 since
X2 is FT -measurable, to get E[X2 | Gt] = E[X2 | Ft]. Next, use the identity
E[1{τ>T}Y | Gt] = 1{τ>t}E[e−
∫ T
t λuduY | Ft],
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which holds for FT -measurable and integrable Y , with Y = X2 − X1. The claim now
follows after some rearrangement.
Lemma 5 Let Xt = X
pre
t 1{τ>t} + X
post
t 1{τ≤t} be a G semimartingale, where Xpre and
Xpost are continuous. Then
dXt = 1{τ≥t}dX
pre
t + 1{τ<t}dX
post
t + (X
post
t −Xpret )d1{τ≤t}. (21)
If X is a strictly positive with representation
dXt
Xt−
= atdBt + btdMt + ctdt,
then bt = (X
post
t /X
pre
t )− 1. If in addition Xpre and Xpost have representations
dXit
Xit
= aitdBt + c
i
tdt, i ∈ {pre, post},
then at = a
pre
t 1{τ≥t} + a
post
t 1{τ<t}.
Proof. The expression (21) follows from Itoˆ’s formula. Concerning the expression for bt,
note that the continuity of Xpre and Xpost implies that
Xt = Yt +
∫ t
0
(Xpostt −Xpret )dMt
for some continuous process Y . Since
∫ t
0 (X
post
s −Xpres )dMs =
∫ t
0 Xs−((X
post
s /X
pre
s )−1)dMs,
the result follows. Finally, combining (21) with the assumed representation for Xpre and
Xpost yields
dXt = 1{τ≥t}X
pre
t a
pre
t dBt + 1{τ<t}X
post
t a
post
t dBt + dY˜t,
where Y˜t is a stochastic integral with respect to dMt and dt only. The expression for at
now follows, since 1{τ≥t}X
pre
t = 1{τ≥t}Xt− and 1{τ<t}X
post
t = 1{τ<t}Xt−.
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B Results relating to stochastic ordering and correlations
Lemma 6 Let X = (Xt)0≤t≤T satisfy dXt = a(t,Xt)dBt + b(t,Xt)dt with a fixed starting
point X0, where we assume that
(i) a(t, x) and b(t, x) are infinitely differentiable;
(ii) X is does not explode;
(iii) for each t > 0, Xt admits a density p(t, x) with continuous second derivatives.
Let Φ be an nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function of x. Then
f(x) = E
[
e
∫ T
0 Φ(Xs)ds
∣∣∣∣XT = x]
is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in x.
Proof. The proof is based on time reversal of diffusions. Let Yt = XT−t. Then XT = Y0
and
∫ T
0 Φ(Xs)ds =
∫ T
0 Φ(Ys)ds, so
f(x) = E[e
∫ T
0 Φ(Ys)ds | Y0 = x].
We wish to apply Theorem 2.1 in Haussmann and Pardoux (1986) to obtain the dynamics
of the time-reversed process Y . The smoothness of p(t, x) and the local Lipschitz property
of a and b (which is guaranteed by their smoothness), together with condition (ii), imply
that the assumptions of that theorem are satisfied; see Haussmann and Pardoux (1986),
Remark 2.2 and Section 3. This yields
dYt = a˜(t, Yt)dB˜t + b˜(t, Yt)dt, (22)
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where
b˜(t, x) = −b(T − t, x) + [a(T − t, x)p(T − t, x)]x
p(T − t, x)
a˜(t, x) = a(T − t, x), (23)
and B˜ is Brownian motion. The smoothness of p, a and b implies that a˜ and b˜ are contin-
uously differentiable on the interior of the support of X, and hence locally Lipschitz there.
By localization we may assume they are globally Lipschitz, so that standard comparison
theorems (see for instance Ikeda and Watanabe (1977)) become available. Specifically, if
x1 ≤ x2 lie in the support of XT , and Y i denotes the solution to (22) started from xi, we
have P (Y 1t ≤ Y 2t , 0 ≤ t < T ) = 1 and hence f(x1) ≤ f(x2) if Φ is nondecreasing. The
case of nonincreasing Φ is deduced in the same manner.
Lemma 7 Let X be as in Lemma 6. Suppose F0, . . . , Fn and G0, . . . , Gn are all nonde-
creasing (resp. all nonincreasing), nonnegative functions, and let 0 ≤ t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn ≤ T .
Then
f(x) = E
[
n∏
i=0
Fi(Xti)
∣∣∣∣XT = x
]
is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing), and we have
E
[
n∏
i=0
Fi(Xti)
n∏
i=0
Gi(Xti)
∣∣∣∣XT
]
≥ E
[
n∏
i=0
Fi(Xti)
∣∣∣∣XT
]
E
[
n∏
i=0
Gi(Xti)
∣∣∣∣XT
]
.
Proof. We treat the nondecreasing case, the other one being similar. Consider again the
time-reversed process Yt = XT−t, and define time points si = T − tn−i, i = 1, . . . , n and
functions F˜i = Fn−i, G˜i = Gn−i. Then 0 ≤ s0 ≤ · · · ≤ sn ≤ T , and we have
f(x) = E
[
n∏
i=0
F˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Y0 = x
]
.
36
The nondecreasing property of f can now be deduced as in the proof of Lemma 6. Con-
cerning the inequality, we are done if we can prove that
E
[
n∏
i=0
F˜i(Ysi)
n∏
i=0
G˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
≥ E
[
n∏
i=0
F˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
E
[
n∏
i=0
G˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
for any s ≤ s0 (take s = 0 to recover the desired inequality.) This is achieved by induction
similarly as in the proof of Lemma A.4 in Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2010). Suppose the
inequality holds for n−1, n−2, etc. Then by the Markov property of Y and the induction
hypothesis,
E
[
n∏
i=0
F˜i(Ysi)
n∏
i=0
G˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
= E
[
F˜0(Ys0)G˜0(Ys0)E
[
n∏
i=1
F˜i(Ysi)
n∏
i=1
G˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys0
] ∣∣∣∣Ys
]
≥ E
[
F˜0(Ys0)F (Ys0)G˜0(Ys0)G(Ys0)
∣∣∣∣Ys] ,
where F (x) = E
[∏n
i=1 F˜i(Ysi) | Ys0 = x
]
and G(x) = E
[∏n
i=1 G˜i(Ysi) | Ys0 = x
]
.
These functions are nondecreasing by the first part of the lemma, so an application of the
induction hypothesis with n = 0 yields
E
[
n∏
i=0
F˜i(Ysi)
n∏
i=0
G˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
≥ E
[
F˜0(Ys0)F (Ys0)
∣∣∣∣Ys]E [G˜0(Ys0)G(Ys0)∣∣∣∣Ys]
= E
[
n∏
i=0
F˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
E
[
n∏
i=0
G˜i(Ysi)
∣∣∣∣Ys
]
,
as desired. It remains to establish the case n = 0; but this follows immediately from
Lemma A.3 in Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2010).
Lemma 8 Let X be as in Lemma 6. Let Φ and Ψ be nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing)
functions. Then
E
[
e
∫ T
0 Φ(Xs)ds+
∫ T
0 Ψ(Xs)ds
∣∣∣∣XT] ≥ E [e∫ T0 Φ(Xs)ds∣∣∣∣XT]E [e∫ T0 Ψ(Xs)ds∣∣∣∣XT] .
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Proof. Approximate e
∫ T
0 Φ(Xs)ds and e
∫ T
0 Ψ(Xs)ds from below using functions of the form
F0(Xt0) · · ·Fn(Xtn), then apply Lemma 7 and monotone convergence.
Lemma 9 Let f , g, G, h and H be measurable functions and define
ψ(x, y) = g(x)G(y)− h(x)H(y).
If f(x) and ψ(x, y) + ψ(y, x) are nonnegative for all x and y, then
E
[
f(X)g(X)
]
E
[
f(X)G(X)
]
− E
[
f(X)h(X)
]
E
[
f(X)H(X)
]
≥ 0 (24)
for every random variable X for which the left side is well-defined. If f(x) > 0 and
ψ(x, y) + ψ(y, x) > 0 for x 6= y, and X has no atoms, the inequality is strict.
Proof. Let X̂ be an independent copy of X. The left side of (24) then equals
E
[
f(X)g(X)f(X̂)G(X̂)− f(X)h(X)f(X̂)H(X̂)
]
= E
[
f(X)f(X̂)ψ(X, X̂)
]
,
and since X and X̂ are exchangeable, it is also equal to
E
[
f(X)f(X̂)ψ(X̂,X)
]
Adding the two expressions yields
E
[
f(X)f(X̂)
(
ψ(X, X̂) + ψ(X̂,X)
)]
,
which is nonnegative due to the assumptions on f and ψ. The statement concerning strict
inequality is immediate.
Lemma 10 Assume that the dividend process is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. dDt =
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µDtdt+ σDtdWt, D0 > 0. Then
E
[
e−
∫ T
0 λ(Du)du
∣∣∣∣DT = x] = E [e− ∫ T0 λ(D˜u)du∣∣∣∣D˜0 = x] , (25)
where the process D˜ satisfies the SDE dD˜t = µ˜(t, D˜t)dt+ σD˜tdWt, with
µ˜(t, x) = −µx+ 1
σ
(
µ− 1
2
σ2 − log(x/D0)
T − t
)
σ˜(t, x) = σx (26)
Proof. Define D˜t = DT−t. Then DT = D˜0 and
∫ T
0 λ(D˜u) =
∫ T
0 λ(Du)du. Therefore,
Eq. (25) holds. The smoothness of the transition density of Dt given by
p(t, y) =
1
yσ
√
2pit
e−
(log(y/D0)−(µ−0.5σ2)t)
2
2σ2t
along with the local Lipschitz property of µx and σx, and the fact that the geometric
Brownian motion is nonexplosive, allow applying Theorem 2.1 in Haussmann and Pardoux
(1986). Using Eq. (23), we obtain the expressions in Eq. (26).
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